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POWER MARKET COUPLING: TOWARDS HARMONISED ELECTRICITY 
POLICIES IN THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY 
 
Abstract 
The ambitious plans of the East African Community (EAC) to provide adequate electricity in 
the region have continued to generate substantial interest among experts in academia, industry 
and government. The communal efforts to realise such targets are predicated on individual 
capacities and cooperative endeavour.  This article focuses on a legal assessment of the EAC 
energy market coupling with a special emphasis on examining whether a harmonised approach 
is possible from two perspectives. First, practical industry concerns and, second, the legal 
framework within which those concerns should be addressed. This article argues that there is 
strong potential for a harmonised approach supported with legal convergence. One important 
index of success in this area would be the promotion and protection of foreign investment to 
ensure enough electricity supply.   
 
1. Introduction 
Several projects have been either planned or are ongoing – both sets are aimed at attaining 
electricity markets coupling1 in the East African Community (EAC).2  One such project is the 
Nile Equatorial Lakes Countries Project (NELSAP) which concerns the construction of 769km 
of 110kv and 220kv lines as well as reinforcement of 17 transformer stations.3 These 
transmission lines include the Uganda-Rwanda interconnection, the Kenya-Uganda 
interconnection and the upgrading of the Burundi, DR Congo, and Rwanda interconnections. 
These projects are key to boosting the EAC power markets and this study assesses the legal 
and regulatory frameworks that underpin the integration of these electricity markets.4 Under 
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these projects, the Kenya-Tanzania interconnection will be upgraded to a 400KV transmission 
line and several interconnections in the country transmission networks will be upgraded as 
well. The interconnection upgrade is implemented by various national utilities in the relevant 
countries. These include the Energy Water and Sanitation Authority (EWSA), Uganda 
Electricity Transmission Company Limited (UETCL), Régie de distribution d'eau 
(REGIDESO), Kenya Electricity Transmission Company (KETRACO) and Tanzania Electric 
Supply Company Limited (TANESCO) as well as Société nationale d'électricité (SNEL) for 
DR Congo.5 
Some considerations are critical to attaining robust electricity markets in the region. These 
considerations include: electricity market design, technical standards, Transmission System 
Operator (TSO) regulations, accommodating bulk renewable energy sources, and 
harmonisation of policies on electricity trade in the region. Transitioning to near 100% 
Renewables (RES) integration should be pursued incrementally in a strategic manner over a 
period. Such strategy should also be predicated on relevant legal, policy and institutional 
changes since the transformation required can be rather complex.6 There are, however, several 
impediments to attaining such changes. An analysis of the electricity policies of EAC Partner 
States reveals the need to ensure privatisation, increase competition and electricity market 
liberalisation.7 The different capacities of Partner States should be carefully assessed in the 
context of electricity market operators. The efforts of various EAC Partner States to promote 
domestic legal and institutional reforms are helpful, but there is a need to consider reforms in 
a manner that ensures overarching regional progress to ensure efficient and sufficient electricity 
supply. Such regional perspective requires a synergy between legal and institutional 
frameworks among Partner States.8 Achieving efficient electricity supply is not only dependent 
on domestic cooperation, but also ensuring such cooperation is not undermined by different 
domestic attitudes in any relevant context. Thus, this article partly argues that the security of 
reliable electricity supply is predicated on securing: investments, institutions with cross-border 
implications and cyber support. This is especially because electricity market liberalisation in 
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the EAC region increases the prospect of foreign investors dealing with the EAC.9 In going 
beyond existing literature, this article examines such issues in an interconnected manner and 
explores the use of a justice system that can support the efforts of the EAC to attain legal, 
policy and institutional goals in a harmonised manner.  
To realise effective electricity markets coupling, it is necessary to review existing laws and 
regulations as well as the establishment of relevant regional and internal institutions that would 
make it possible to implement a robust coupled electricity market. Members of the EAC are at 
different levels of restructuring, but relevant roadmaps are generally similar and all the 
countries are developing.  This is partly why the EAC has emerged as an important platform 
for the countries in the region to adopt progressive strategies through a unified policy 
framework.  
The implementation of the regional projects geared towards the development of a regional 
market requires some level of legal convergence for market operations and harmonisation of 
key market rules. The EAC legal framework will first provide a useful context to understand 
how the countries involved stand considering the electricity markets generally. This is the basis 
on which the comparative analysis in this article will be conducted with a view to examining 
individual EAC members’ approaches and how such approaches to key laws and energy 
policies can be harmonised. 
 
2. Bases for Comparative Analysis in the EAC  
About half of the people worldwide who lack access to electricity live in sub-Saharan Africa 
and East Africa is particularly affected.10 Even those who have access to electricity often find 
that supply can be epileptic or insufficient.11 Most of the EAC countries are currently among 
the fastest growing African economies. One of the implications of this development is the need 
for an electricity market that can support economic expansion and sustainable development. 
International energy cooperation and coordination can pose their own challenges especially 
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where there are somewhat divergent interests (for example, one country may focus on security 
while another is more concerned about the environment).12 However, a specific articulation of 
how a region can attain a common energy objective is foundational in efforts to attain a 
harmonised approach with respect to challenges that relevant countries tackle. In the EAC, 
there is a clear overarching policy that serves as a common denominator for comparative 
analysis. 
Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda already had a history of international cooperation under several 
regional endeavours as long ago as the first half of the 20th century.13 This cooperation 
expanded officially when Rwanda and Burundi became full members of the EAC in 2007 after 
acceding to the EAC Treaty.14 South Sudan is the most recent member of the EAC having 
joined in 2016, nearly a decade after Rwanda and Burundi joined.15 South Sudan is excluded 
from the scope of this article partly because it has yet to develop a robust internal policy and 
institutional framework as it gained independence only half a decade prior to becoming a 
member of the EAC.16 South Sudan will nonetheless look to consolidate the benefits of 
becoming a member of the EAC, especially as it had already explored possible access to 
cheaper diesel (for self-generated electricity which is practically how the country has been run) 
through Kenyan and Ugandan road networks.17 There is thus a common thread of energy 
interests with a special focus on electricity needs for the countries involved and in the context 
of this article. Furthermore, an ambitious Electricity Master Plan was developed as a blue print 
for ‘generation and transmission expansion in the region for the next 25 years’.18 Such 
strategies are anchored to the EAC Treaty.19 Under the Treaty, Partner States (used 
interchangeably with ‘member countries’ in this article’) are required to ‘adopt policies and 
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18<https://www.eac.int/statements/566-986-699-address-by-secretary-general-amb-liberat-mfumukeko-during-
the-press-conference-on-10th-october-2016-at-the-eac-headquarters> accessed 7 May 2019. 
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mechanisms to promote the efficient exploitation, development, joint research and utilisation 
of various energy resources available within the region’.20 The Treaty also provides for the 
development of an integrated policy on rural electrification21 and inter-Partner State electrical 
grid interconnections.22 The overarching Treaty provisions and aims support a comparative 
methodology that is appropriate for ascertaining the common core with respect to applicable 
legal frameworks and policies. 
This article is based on comparative legal research.23  This approach involves a consideration 
of differences that exist between the comparators,24 partly because this also helps to explore 
why relevant indicators exist.25 The differences between countries are factored in under 
relevant Treaty provisions which makes the Treaty a robust framework with which sustainable 
progress can take place. For example, the principle of variable geometry is important in the 
integration of the EAC. This principle connotes cooperation among groups and integration of 
different schemes or fields may occur at different speeds.26 Thus, peculiar challenges of 
individual Partner States do not undermine the common parameters that are relevant to 
determine the unifying factors between the Partner States with a view to attaining the ultimate 
end of providing adequate and efficient electricity market in the region. The East African Court 
of Justice has interpreted this operational principle of variable geometry in a progressive 
manner that ensures no time is lost even though some individual Partner States may be unable 
to progress at the same speed as others.27 
This article investigates the legal rules, the structures to assess the significance of their 
similarities and differences. A comparative analysis of the legal rules and structure enables the 
underlying objectives necessary regulatory interventions to be realised.28 The research draws 
upon a wide range of sources, including the primary electricity legislation in Kenya, Uganda, 
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Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi.  Secondary sources include academic literature, energy 
policies and reports on the Northern Corridor Integration projects as well as electricity power 
masterplans for each jurisdiction.  
Considering the prospects for the coupling of the EAC market, this article first evaluates how 
the existing electricity laws compare if the regional market is to integrate. The electricity laws 
and policies of each Partner State is examined vis-à-vis the operational principle of variable 
geometry. This principle is of importance in this article because it means that institutional 
inadequacies in any Partner State need not frustrate holistic progress towards attaining common 
ends and that a harmonised approach is possible within defined parameters. The electricity 
policies of the Partner States provide the context within which relevant institutional and legal 
frameworks can be interpreted and assessed.  
 
3. Electricity Policies of Individual Partner States  
An overview of the EAC roadmap in regional electrification has been provided. There is a need 
to provide further specific context with respect to practical challenges, liberalisation of the 
electricity market, and domestic institutions that support electricity market coupling. This 
section provides a summary of each Partner State’s position and unpacks the challenges which 
Partner States should address to be in strategic positions to benefit from regional harmonisation 
efforts. It is necessary first to consider privatisation because many leading scholars have found 
that privatisation may lead to increased efficiency.29  
 
3.1. Privatisation and Electricity Market Liberalisation 
Inadequate access to affordable and reliable electricity has impeded the attainment of socio-
economic goals in the East African region. Less than half of the population have access to 
electricity in Tanzania.30 Only about 10% of the Burundian population have access to 
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electricity.31 Such minimal access has undermined development in Burundi as well as in 
Rwanda where the government has conceded that electricity access is critical to accelerating 
economic development.32 In Uganda, inefficient power system is partly due to relatively low 
generation capacity, poor transmission or distribution infrastructure and poor commercial 
utility practices.33 Although Kenya has the highest electricity access rate in East Africa, up to 
25% of Kenyans still lack access to electricity.34 All these countries have responded to such 
challenges, in varying degrees, through a number of strategies. One such strategy is 
privatisation. In considering Partner States’ individual approaches to liberalising the power 
market, it is necessary first to provide the legislative framework within such States have 
operated. 
3.1.1. Tanzania  
Tanzania developed the first National Energy Policy (NEP) in 1992 as a result of the socio-
economic reforms that took place during 1990s.35 Since then, there have been legislative 
reviews that culminated in the Electricity Act of 2008.  This Act supported the increase in 
electricity supply, creation of a regulator—Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority 
(EWURA), Rural Energy Agency (REA) and the Rural Energy Fund (REF). Despite this 
policy, there existed low private sector participation in the electricity supply, limited energy 
mix, expensive sources of energy supply and over-reliance on Government subsidies to develop 
power plants. The NEP of 2015 was then reviewed to address these issues. The demand for 
electricity has been growing at a rate of 10-15% per annum while the annual electricity 
consumption per capita is about 105kWh. This is against the optimum global per capita 
consumption of 500kWh.36. 
The NEP (policy) envisages the establishment of the legal and regulatory framework for an 
Independent System Operator (ISO), an Independent Market Operator.37 The policy also 
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emphasises targeted subsidies for strategic energy infrastructure investment.38 Although this 
policy may seem to benefit consumers, it is not conducive to competitive electricity markets. 
Electricity markets should be left to compete freely so that the price of electricity is cost-
reflective and gives each participant equal ground in the supply bid. In 2016, the Tanzanian 
government developed the Electricity Act regulations (the Electricity Sector Re-Organisation 
Regulations) that are designed to promote competition and reorganising the electricity 
markets.39 These regulations provide guidelines on the market re-organisation such that all 
vertically integrated utilities, generation, transmission, and distribution are unbundled.40  
Different stages of the unbundling are set up to run concurrently with the last component 
expected to be in place by June 2025.41 Tanzania has established relevant legal and regulatory 
frameworks to attract private investment.42 With the enactment of these laws, Tanzania is 
clearly pursuing significant institutional changes in the energy sector. Several Independent 
Power Producers (IPPs), Emergency Power Producers (EPPs) and Small Power Producers 
(SPP) are participating in the electricity generation.43 However, there is still significant State 
control which is likely to continue in the short term. This is partly due to the practical challenge 
of ‘low creditworthiness’.44 Furthermore, the strategic plan to phase out direct public 
ownership is not anchored to ‘the necessary buy-in’ and realisation of the plan is thus 
debatable.45 Tanzania will benefit from this research vis-à-vis the benefits of integrating the 
power markets in the region and the importance of expanding the market at the regional level. 
The differences in the individual capacities of Partner States can be illustrated through the 
Burundian experience. 
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The Ministry of Water, Energy and Mining (MWEM) has the overall responsibility for the 
energy sector while the policies are implemented through the Directorate General of Water and 
Energy (DGEE) and the Directorate General of Hydraulics and Rural Electrification (DGHER). 
MWEM therefore supervises REGIDESO, which has a monopoly on electricity generation, 
distribution, and supply. Burundi suffers from inadequate transmission infrastructure and hence 
is faced with frequent load shedding resulting in many entities and homes resorting to personal 
generators. 
In the EAC region, Burundi has the least installed capacity amounting to 34MW composed of 
hydropower and thermal power. The power sector is vertically integrated through Régie de 
Production et de Distribution d'Eau et d'Electricité (REGIDESO). The electrification rate and 
the peak demand is 2% and 100MW respectively, a capacity that is considered the lowest in 
the EAC region.46. The investment in the power sector stagnates while the demand continues 
to rise therefore causing a deficit and systematic load-shedding. The energy policy in Burundi 
focuses on three main areas: modernising existing power plants, reducing power demand, 
extending the power transmission infrastructure, and extending the electrification rate 
especially in rural areas. There are also plans to expand the transmission lines to tap renewables 
from solar power plants.47 
Some key challenges inhibiting the expansion of the power sector include a lack of a proper 
legal framework that leads the IPP engagement, the limited human capacity and poor access to 
seed capital. Some specific laws enacted to attract IPP investment lack clarity on 
implementation.48 In particular, the lack of well-designed power tariffs discourages private 
investors from investing in the power sector. This means that electricity supply will continue 
to be a major issue unless there is significant improvement on the power tariff design and long 
term Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) that support the investors who are interested in 
participating in the power generation sector.49 Law No. 01/14 of 2000 was enacted to liberalise 
and regulate the water and electricity sector. This law has been repealed by the new electricity 
law No 1/13 that was promulgated in 2015 to allow for public-private partnerships but still 
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grants REGIDESO powers to remain as the main entity responsible for managing transmission 
and distribution networks.50  
In 2011, a control and regulation entity was established by Decree No. 100/320 of 2011 to 
regulate and monitor activities related to water and electricity.51 This entity, Agency for the 
Water and Electricity sectors referred to as Authority for Regulation of Water and Energy 
Sectors (AREEN) is responsible for the regulation of electricity tariffs and proper application 
of pricing principles. About the same time, Decree No 100/318 of 2011 gave rise to the 
establishment of the Burundian Agency for Rural Electrification (ABER) which was meant to 
spearhead the expansion of the electrification rate to the rural population. Of great benefit to 
investors are Law No. 1/24 of 2008 and Law No. 1/23 of 2008 which directed the formulation 
of the new investment code outlining the tax benefits to investors. This therefore led to the 
establishment of the Investment Promotion Agency (IPA) in 2009 under Decree No. 1/177 of 
2009 to improve the investment climate for foreign investors by serving as a one-stop shop for 
prospective investors in Burundi.  
There is no exchange control in Burundi which implies that foreign investors are free to deposit 
their revenues outside Burundi.52 Law No 1/13 of 2015 is significant for power markets because 
it was promulgated to allow compliance with the Central Africa Power Pool (CAPP) 
procedures that declares an authorisation regime but does not allow for liberalisation in 
Burundi. The law transforms the Agency for the Water and Electricity sectors in Burundi into 
Agency Supervising and Regulating the Electricity Sector which is now a legal entity with 
financial autonomy. Although this law has the potential to align with the CAPP, it does not 
address the interconnection issues and therefore has not harmonised with the East African 
Power Pool (EAPP) regulations. These legal frameworks have promoted the development of 
several regional projects such as the new 200MW hydro-electric project and the ongoing 
transmission and distribution lines (86 km Ruzizi III-Bujumbura, 161km Rusumo fall line, and 
143km Kigoma-Gitega line). However, the 2015 Electricity Act does not allow for 
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liberalisation or the unbundling of the electricity sector. This is a key area that should be 
reviewed to facilitate power market coupling in the region. Such prerequisites can be compared 
with the legal and policy developments in Rwanda – a country that joined the EAC in the same 
era as Burundi.  
 
3.1.3. Rwanda 
In Rwanda, the Ministry of Infrastructure (MINIFRA), is responsible for the development of 
the relevant energy policies and for establishing necessary legal frameworks for the sector. The 
Rwanda Energy Group Ltd. (REG ltd) operates and maintains the power transmission system 
while the Rwanda Utilities Regulatory Authority (RURA) regulates the energy market through 
updating the grid code, enforcing the power service standards, reviewing the tariff structure, 
and licensing the power generation, transmission, and distribution companies.53 The main 
regulations guiding the electricity sector in Rwanda stem from the Investment Code (2014), 
PPP Law (2014), Electricity Act (2011),54 the Law Establishing and Determining the Mandate 
of the Rwanda Utilities Regulatory Authority and the Organic Law on Environment (2005). 
The Electricity Act of 2008 was enacted to spearhead the unbundling of the then monopoly 
ELCTROGAS into Rwanda Energy Corporation (RECO) and Rwanda Water and Sewerage 
Corporation (RWASCO). The National Energy Policy and National Energy Strategy of 2011 
and the Electricity Act of 2011 integrated RECO and RWASCO into a single entity called 
Energy and Water and Sanitation Authority (EWSA) a monopsony entity; also responsible for 
bulk transmission, distribution and retailing of power. Subsequently, the energy policy of 2011 
was reviewed in March 2015. The 2015 energy policy addresses energy security, access, 
provision of robust legal framework, cost of generation and climate change, among other 
issues.55 The policy outlines, as one of its key objectives, the enhancement of regional 
cooperation and trade in electricity, including transmission network development. Although 
little is mentioned in the context of regional electricity trade, the various developments in the 
sector are geared towards achieving this goal.  
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contribute towards policy making as well as tariff regulation. 
54 The Electricity Law No 21/2011 of 23/06/2011 governing electricity activities in Rwanda. 




Like the case of Burundi, the review of relevant laws to open the market is critical to the 
development of a robust power market. This review could, in addition to ensuring promotion 
of electricity generation locally, provide guidance on cross border electricity trade. Overall, 
Rwanda is in the early stages of regional energy coupling with a view to giving the country a 
competitive edge under the regional power trade through a coupled electricity market. The 
development of appropriate legal frameworks and policies should be assessed in light of 
relatively minimal experience in power markets. This contrasts with the more extensive 
experiences of Uganda and Kenya – their experiences have evolved into significantly 
articulated positions. Thus, discussions will be relatively brief. 
 
3.1.4. Uganda 
The power sector in Uganda is hinged on three main policy documents: the Electricity Act of 
1999,56  the Energy Policy of 2002,57 and the renewable energy policy of 2007.58 The Electricity 
Act of 2007 ensured the unbundling and privatisation of Uganda Electricity Board (UEB) 
which was considered a monopoly. The main functions of the Electricity Regulation Agency 
include: to issue licenses for generation, transmission, distribution, supply and import from 
neighbouring countries.59 Among other powers, the Electricity Act of 1999 established the 
Electricity Regulatory Authority (ERA) and provided for the generation, transmission, 
distribution, sale and use of electricity to make the electricity sector competitive.60  
Subsequently, Uganda Electricity Generation Company (UEGCL) was formed and is 
responsible for power generation. Competition has been introduced through the licensing of 
IPPs in power generation. This reform has expanded the electricity rate. The Ugandan energy 
policy addresses the security of electricity supply, access to affordable and modern source of 
energy, fostering sustainable economic growth and mitigating any environmental impacts 
related to energy supply. 
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The electricity energy sector reform started with the unbundling of the then Kenya Power and 
Lighting Company (KPLC) into Kenya Electricity Generating Company (KenGen) in 1997, 
the formation of Rural Electrification Authority (REA) in 2007 and independent Energy 
Regulator in 2007. Kenya Electricity Transmission Company Limited (KETRACO) and the 
Geothermal Development Company Limited (GDC) were operationalised in 2008 as special 
purpose corporations to oversee the extension of the transmission network and speedy 
realisation of renewable energy respectively. The reform has led to the entry of several 
Independent Power Producers (IPPs) and the Kenya Nuclear Electricity Board (KNEB).61 The 
Kenya Electricity Generating Company and Kenya Power and Lighting Company have since 
undergone further partial privatisation.  
The beginning of the accelerated reform process took shape at the adoption of the 2004 
sessional paper No. 4 on energy.62 The paper highlighted two main objectives namely: to allow 
power generators to access bulk electricity consumer through the power transmission network 
and secondly, to create a domestic power pool that will allow the formation of a robust 
wholesale and retail market. The Energy Act of 2006 mandated the restructuring of the energy 
sector.63 Under this Act, various institutions have been formed thus permitting private 
participation and ownership of stakes in power generation. The new Energy Act of 2019 should 
give more impetus to the entry of private investors and outlines further institutional frameworks 
that are yet to be installed. 64 This Act has further expanded the mandate of the regulatory 
agency-Energy Petroleum Regulatory Authority (EPRA) – formally known as Energy 
Regulatory Commission (ERC) and the added new roles for the Rural Electrification and 
Renewable energy (REREC)-Formerly known as REA , to include largescale power generation 
from RES. The formation of REREC will by far speed up the development of renewable energy 
and further expand the reform agenda in Kenya. Although the unbundling and corporatisation 
have progressed, the partly private entities continue to dominate. Consequently, the market 
concentration remains high even when more private investors have joined the market.  
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In 2010, the Kenyan government promulgated a new constitution which among other issues 
led to the passing of other laws that are key to the development of energy in the national 
Government and the County Governments. The Transition to Devolved Government Act of 
2012,65 the County Government Act, and the Urban Areas and Cities Act together are designed 
to shed light on legislative guidelines to the counties for providing devolved services including 
energy services. The renewable energy regulations were later drafted to guide in the 
development and installation of these resources. These include: The Energy (Solar 
Photovoltaic) Regulations, 2012,66 the Draft Energy (Improve Biomass Cook stoves, the 
Energy (Energy Management) Regulation, 201267 and the Energy (Solar Water Heating) 
Regulation, 2012.68 The Energy (Electricity Licensing) Regulation, 2012 sets out requirements 
for individuals carrying out generation, transmission, distribution, or supply of electrical 
energy in Kenya.69 Additionally, the Kenya Electricity Grid Code provides a consolidated 
standard of practices in the supply of electricity.  This Code provides for scheduling and 
dispatch process, system security, and ring fencing and transmission and distribution network 
system.70 
 
4. Fundamentals of Possible Convergence in the EAC 
4.1. Common Denominators 
The EAC is driven by the need to foster customs union, common market, monetary union, and 
political federation. Energy market coupling is one of the pillars of the common market with 
an overarching objective of optimal supply, reliability, cost effectiveness, and environmentally 
friendly energy for the population. This objective extends to considering ways of attracting 
investment in the energy sector. As part of the agenda to secure reliable energy, the EAC in 
July 2017 adopted the Energy Security Policy Framework that outlines the measures to ensure 
energy security.71  
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In pursuit of these objectives, the EAC market needs to take measures that support the 
sustainability and the security of supply of electricity within the market. One of the common 
foci identified in the comparative studies of the electricity laws in the countries under 
consideration is the drive to mitigate the environmental impact through promotion of 
investment in renewable energy across the region. The second common focus is the coupling 
of the electricity markets and promotion of liberalisation. These common ends can be achieved 
through consistent review and adoption of policy, laws and strengthening the institutions 
earmarked for supporting this transition.  
The comparative study in the preceding section is further discussed to identify the level of 
convergence by highlighting the following: the foreseeable challenges to market coupling and 
barriers, the harmonisation of relevant electricity laws, determining the locus of convergence, 
and models that can support the power market structure.  
 
4.2. Impediments to Integration  
The EAC electricity markets are faced with threats to coupling which need to be addressed 
before the process of integration can start. First, the levels of the market structures vary 
considerably and they are at different levels of liberalisation.72 The power subsector in Burundi, 
Rwanda are predominantly vertically integrated,73 while Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda have 
unbundled the generation and the transmission.74 Secondly, while the five countries under 
examination have established national energy regulators, their independence has not been 
realised.75 The regulatory index as studied by the African Development Bank indicates that 
these Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania’s index averages at about 0.75 while Burundi and Rwanda 
are below 0.5.76  These indices therefore support the argument that the regulatory frameworks 
are at varying stages where, the former markets are at intermediate stage while the later, still at 
foundation stage.77 Furthermore, these indices portray the impact of attracting investment in 
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infrastructure in the region that is key to establishing the coupling of the market, as well as 
highlighting foreseeable risks such as institutional stability and macroeconomic risks. Thirdly, 
the lack of strong infrastructure in the internal markets as well as cross border lines hinder the 
development of an internal energy market for the region. Some development partners and 
institutions are working towards ensuring expansion of high voltage transmission line which 
are vital in enhancing electricity trade amongst the countries.78 However, the harmonisation of 
the energy policies should be spearheaded to provide robust market rules that ensure 
operationalisation of the market is smooth. Fourthly, a close look at the weak transmission 
infrastructure reveals that the EAC has not yet established robust cybersecurity critical for the 
energy infrastructure.79 Cyber-resilient energy systems are critical to an integrated market such 
as that advocated for the EAC where there is an expectation of highly interconnected systems. 
The challenges in the current market structure that can delay the coupling concern the 
differences in levels of electricity market liberalisation and the willingness of the individual 
countries to initiate necessary laws and regulations to enforce market coupling.  Kenya, 
Tanzania, and Uganda have already made significant steps towards liberalisation through 
partial unbundling of their power sectors. They have also drafted some laws that foresee 
regional power trade with the neighbouring countries. Burundi is yet to develop laws that allow 
restructuring in the power sector and that sector remains vertically integrated. The EAC has, 
however, taken several initiatives to support the region in enacting robust laws that will support 
regional power trade. As will be further discussed in detail shortly, the region will move more 
quickly towards harmonisation of the electricity laws if Burundi and Rwanda can expedite the 
review of their laws to allow further restructure and competition laws.80 Furthermore, the 
establishment of a regional institution that focuses on the harmonised approach to relevant 
Partner States’ laws would facilitate restructuring faster as opposed to individual countries 
working independently. It would help to have more laws with certain principles of coupling 
spelling out the regulatory environment and the boundaries of legitimacy from which other 
local electricity laws could stem. Such a regional body will also be subject to, and benefit from, 
the harmonisation efforts of the East African Court of Justice (EACJ) to be discussed shortly. 
It is necessary to contextualise the efforts of legal harmonisation considering dispute resolution 
in the region and the pivotal role of the EACJ. 
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4.3. Dispute Resolution and Investor Confidence 
Disputes are inevitable in the course of dealing with projects that often involve international 
elements. This is especially so as supplies and expertise may be required from abroad. It is 
somewhat ironic that the justice system itself is sometimes undermined by epileptic power 
supply and the need for expensive back-up generators.81 Furthermore, there are several 
challenges of the justice systems that are common in the East African community. Examples 
include expensive litigation processes,82 inadequate or no published reports of commercial 
cases decided by appellate courts,83 and corruption in the judiciary.84 Individual Partner States 
have made certain individual efforts in addressing some relevant legal and justice system 
challenges.85 However, relevant legal reform should be built on a dispute resolution synergy in 
the EAC to prevent any weak link from undermining overall progress in the electricity sector. 
It is, therefore, necessary to provide an analytical overview of Partner States.  
Agreements form a core element of international commercial transactions concerning 
electricity supply.86 In this context, the need for efficient dispute resolution is necessary 
especially in developing countries vis-à-vis regional frameworks.87 There have been clear 
judicial efforts to ensure agreements are protected and respected. This should build investor 
confidence which is critical to sustainable progress in this area of power markets coupling. An 
example is Dowans Holding SA v Tanzania Electric Co Ltd.88 Both parties executed an 
emergency power off-take agreement until Tanzania Electric Co Ltd (the defendant) argued 
                                                          
81 For this point in Uganda, see Legal Assistance for Economic Reform, ‘Retrospective Study of the Progress, 
Performance and Impact of the Uganda Commercial Court 1996-2015’ (Report of 6 November 2015) para 5.5. 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/591b07e6e5274a5e4e000010/uganda-com-ct-study.pdf> 
accessed 5 October 2019. 
82 J Mawejje, E Munyambonera, L Bategeka, ‘Uganda’s Electricity Sector Reforms and Institutional 
Structuring’ – Research Series No 89 (Economic Policy Research Centre, 2012) 25. 
83 For an insight into Burundi, see World Bank, ‘Doing Business 2019: Economic Profile Burundi’ (A World 
Bank Group Flagship Report) 45. 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/240471541067681956/pdf/131613-WP-DB2019-PUBLIC-
Burundi.pdf> accessed 5 October 2019.  
84 Burundi enacted specific legislation to tackle corruption in the judiciary. See Law No 1/36 of 13/12 2006 that 
established the anti-corruption court within the judiciary. See also, African Development Bank Group  
: Republic of Burundi Country Strategy Paper 2019-2023 (African Development Bank 2019) XXVI 
<https://www.afdb.org/sites/default/files/documents/projects-and-
operations/burundi_country_strategy_paper_2019-2023-rev.pdf> accessed 11 October 2019. 
85 S Bimenyimana, GNO Asemota, and L Li, ‘The State of the Power Sector in Rwanda: A Progressive Sector 
with Ambitious Targets’ (2018) Frontiers in Energy Research: Policy and Practice Review 1, 2. 
86 T Ziesemer, ‘Renewable Energy Supply, Infrastructure and Gains from International Trade in Electric 
Current’ (2019) 17 Applied Economics Letters 1439, 1442.  
87 In the context of African integrated power markets, see MO Oseni and M Pollitt, ‘Institutional Arrangements 
for the Promotion of Regional Integration of Electricity Markets: International Experience’ EPRG Working 
Paper 1408 Cambridge Working Paper in Economics 1458 (Energy Policy Research Group 2014) 6-9. 




that the agreement was void from the beginning since it contravened the Tanzanian Public 
Procurement Act of 2004. An International Chamber of Commerce tribunal decided that the 
agreement was valid, so the tribunal ordered payment and awarded damages. The defendant 
petitioned the Tanzanian High Court where the award had been filed for it to be set aside or 
remitted for reconsideration. The English court granted permission to D to enforce the award 
in England. Although the English court considered that the defendant’s arguments were not 
fanciful in light of Tanzanian case law,89 it safeguarded the claimant’s position ‘in relation to 
their loss of opportunity’ by ordering security in the sum of $5m as a condition for granting an 
adjournment.90  It is also instructive that Tanzanian and Kenyan authorities were considered in 
trying to delimit the scope of public policy.91 
In a recent judgment, the Kenyan Court of Appeal approved the decision in the Tanzanian case 
of DB Shapriya & Co Ltd v Bish International BV and gave a narrow interpretation of 
‘misconduct’ to ensure the arbitrator’s findings of fact were not undermined.92 The court 
decided that judicial intervention should be limited to errors of law which are apparent on the 
face of the record.93 The court denied the application to set aside the award and observed that 
the expedition, efficacy and finality were supposed to make arbitration a better option to 
litigation.94 Although arbitration is ideal in principle, especially in the context of trying to attain 
a fair resolution of disputes, it may pose its own challenges in the power sector. It is important 
to assess any contextual challenges as countries such as Tanzania move towards increased 
privatisation in the generation of electricity.95 For example, a balance should be struck between 
promoting privatisation and ensuring its benefits are not undermined through expensive or 
lengthy dispute resolution processes.  
In Uganda, there are efforts to ensure the dispute resolution process succeeds in the electricity 
sector. For example, Jinja Produce & Millers Association Ltd v Umeme (U) Ltd signed 
contracts for the supply of electricity to the grinding mills of several applicants.96 A single 
arbitrator was appointed through intervention powers after the applicants repeatedly failed to 
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agree on how a three-man arbitrator panel would be constituted.97 Uganda has a tribunal 
dedicated to electricity matters and it has jurisdiction to determine any matter concerning the 
electricity sector.98 The Ugandan courts have also held State agencies accountable in cases 
where damages have been awarded,99 decided claims were not time barred against investors,100 
and refused to indulge litigants who try to delay court proceedings.101 
Rwanda and Burundi belong to a legal tradition different to Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. 
While the latter were former British colonies and thus influenced by the English common law, 
the former have a different colonial history and thus influenced by civil law.102 The central 
importance of binding precedent, a distinctive feature of the English common law, arguably 
helped to develop the jurisprudence of Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda.103 Nevertheless, Rwanda 
has demonstrated great resolve to overhaul its dispute resolution system. For example, one of 
Rwanda’s legal reforms was introducing the doctrine of binding precedent into the Supreme 
Court.104 This has been supported with a clear alignment with the EACJ and Rwanda has 
benefited from this alignment. In Union Trade Centre Limited (UTC) v the Attorney General 
of Rwanda,105 for example, the Appeal Division of the EACJ decided that it was wrong for the 
trial court to adjudicate the case instituted by the applicant without evidence ‘in a situation 
where factual evidence was clearly called for.’106 The trial court was asked to hear the matter 
afresh. 
Burundi has more challenges with respect to the dispute resolution system generally. Burundi 
has continuously ranked lowest in the East Africa Bribery Index for more than half a decade.107 
The judiciary is one of the institutions most affected by petty corruption.108 Burundi has tested 
the interpretative ingenuity of the EACJ and a good illustration is Desire v the Attorney General 
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of Burundi.109 The applicant, a Burundian, argued that his property rights were violated. 
Essentially, the applicant was not satisfied with the decision of the Burundian Supreme Court. 
The applicant argued that Burundian law was misapplied, reasons not given for its decision and 
failing to provide adequate guidance on the legal and probative value of attested affidavits thus 
creating legal uncertainty.110 The EACJ observed that it was necessary to provide ‘coherent 
legal justification for the conclusions arrived at’ despite the civilian legal tradition background 
of Burundi.111 Although a ‘cavalier judicial approach was depicted in the impugned judgment’, 
there was insufficient evidence that the rule of law was contravened vis-à-vis the Treaty.112 It 
should be emphasised that these arguments are not predicated on any supranational 
enforcement mechanism.113 The point is that the EACJ can shape regional integration through 
a progressive and contextual application of the EAC Treaty.114 Developing a coherent 
jurisprudence with respect to EAC Treaty provisions requires a consideration of domestic laws 
to ensure legal convergence is not undermined. In this regard, it would be challenging to ensure 
a harmonised approach to dealing with legal and industry impediments to power coupling if 
relevant institutions are absent or inefficient.  
4.4. Institutions for Convergence 
As already stated, individual Partner States have made certain efforts in domestic legal reform. 
In Kenya, for example, the electricity sector Energy Tribunal was formed in 2007 as an 
independent committee to arbitrate any disputes between the regulator and the investors.115 
Regardless of how well domestic courts may be willing to determine relevant matters that are 
brought before them, there is usually a possibility that a clear alignment of domestic interests 
and Community interests may be a challenge. Striking a balance between the interests of 
Partner State governments, the EAC and private litigants requires a clear understanding of how 
communal interests should be advanced without undermining the individual Partner States’ 
fundamental laws and public policies. Accepting judicial interpretation at the regional level is 
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not new to the East African region. For example, the erstwhile East Africa Court of Appeal 
sometimes endorsed decisions of the English House of Lords.116 Such decisions have remained 
useful in contemporary times in some cases where electricity stakeholders are litigants.117 The 
East African Court of Justice has made considerable efforts to navigate the area of intersections 
between Partner States’ municipal laws and the EAC Treaty.  
In Kyarimpa v the Attorney General of Uganda,118 a case concerning the construction of the 
600 MW Karuma Hydroelectric Plant, one of the issues was whether the trial court was wrong 
to decide that the ‘selection and subsequent signing of the MoU between the GoU and 
Sinohydro’ was consistent with articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Treaty.119 This was on the basis that 
Ugandan public procurement law and Ugandan court orders had been violated.120 The relevant 
Treaty provisions generally concerned good governance and accountability,121 as well as 
abstaining from measures ‘likely to jeopardize the achievement of those objectives or the 
implementation of the provisions of the Treaty’.122 The Appellate Division of the East African 
Court of Justice accepted the appellant’s submission that since the trial court found that no 
‘written bilateral agreement’ was produced before the court, it was wrong to infer that such an 
agreement existed merely based on inferences drawn from other documents including 
correspondence between government officials in Uganda.123 It is instructive that apart from the 
Ugandan Constitution which referred to the ‘execution’ of agreements, Ugandan public 
procurement law contained mandatory provisions.124 Although the Appellate Division did not 
specifically mention the issue of public policy, it is clear that considering the implications for 
Ugandan mandatory law and constitutional provisions was important. Ironically, the Ugandan 
government was in breach of Ugandan procurement laws and such conduct was likely to 
jeopardise the aims of the Treaty.125 This case also illustrates the point that while public policy 
would be interpreted narrowly to ensure that investor confidence is not jeopardised, there 
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should be enough room to strike a balance between individual litigant or State interests and a 
harmonised approach to matters concerning the power sector. 
Kyarimpa v the Attorney General of Uganda seemed to be an elaboration of a trajectory that 
had been charted by the EACJ to ensure a proper navigation of the intersections between 
individual partner States laws and the EAC Treaty. In the context of Rwanda, the EACJ had 
earlier observed that a violation of individual State laws and procedures amounted to a violation 
of the rule of law and, by extension, contravened the Treaty.126  
The courts can promote harmonisation through encouraging a strategic implementation of 
domestic laws and a progressive interpretation of the Treaty. A cooperative approach towards 
harnessing energy is critical to reducing inefficiency.  The otherwise varied and complicated 
nature of domestic laws would impede uncertainty for foreign investors. There is evidence that 
harmonisation of energy laws in trade communities results in ‘increased efficiency and 
approvals for the energy sector thereby cutting one or two years off the overall approval process 
(thereby allowing project development to occur faster) and enhancing domestic GDP by 
upwards of 8%-10%’.127 A progressive navigation of the intersections between domestic and 
Treaty provisions will create the jurisprudential impetus to inspire Partner States that 
experience more challenges to strive towards genuine improvement. In this manner, investor 
confidence will be buoyed by the safety net and support of the Community. This approach will 
also ensure a practical application of the variable geometry provided under the Treaty. This 
practical application will also support the establishment of a regional body earlier discussed.128 
The establishment of a regional body will assist in the process of liberalisation and restructuring 
through provision of capacity building and other relevant formulations that are necessary to 
promote smooth transition from the current structure to an integrated energy market for the 
regions. This entity will also define the locus of convergence.  This convergence will help to 
ensure energy security, reduce greenhouse emissions, promote competition and investment, 
and develop shared infrastructure for the region. The recognition and structuring of an 
appropriate locus of convergence is critical to the subsequent coupling process because such 
convergence will promote foreign investment. There are two identifiable loci of energy 
convergence. These are energy security and lowering of greenhouse gas emission.  The laws 
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of Kenya and Tanzania stipulate strategies to promote competition in the electricity market. 
Generally, there is vast literature on promoting the energy security component as a precursor 
to economic growth.129  
On the component of models for supporting the power structure, much has been discussed and 
some models of the design of the electricity market developed. A good electricity market design 
for the EAC can adopt an appropriate Renewable Energy Continuum (RIC) model from 
amongst other structures to smoothly gravitate the transition. Laws and policies are 
spearheaded by various entities entrusted with the development and enactment. However, 
political will is a vital element in ensuring that the whole process is feasible. Such willingness 
is an important context within which regional institutional integration and electricity market 
coupling should thrive.  
5. Regional Institutional Integration and Electricity Market Coupling  
The EAC is considered as one of the most integrated markets in Africa. Substantial initiatives 
to integrate these markets have emerged since these Partner States ratified the EAC Common 
Market Protocol (CMP) on the establishment of a common market and came into force in 
2010.130 The integration process that began in 2005 on the inauguration of the EAC Customs 
Union to enhance the removal of barriers to trade. There are several options for electricity 
market coupling, and these will be discussed. 
In considering regional institutional integration, it is difficult to isolate such institutions from 
the political contexts in which such institutions are situated.131 Regional integration, which 
involves intersections between laws and political economies, allows the willing parties or 
countries to cooperate on some agreed objectives.132 Notable objectives include economic 
cooperation, political federation or security cooperation and removal of trade barriers as well 
as allowing for free movement of people within the region.  For example, the planned pooling 
of electricity for nine countries was thwarted due to the politics involving the use of the River 
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Nile thus leading to countries opting out of the gentleman’s agreement to pool the electricity 
markets.133 For a robust electricity market to exist, proper political risk analysis for the EAC 
countries through appropriate instruments to assess the willingness of the parties to enter into 
long term relationships for engaging the power markets competitively is vital. The political 
stability of the Partner States under consideration is key to the smooth transition to the power 
markets and various plans are in process of being instituted. 
The political stability in these countries is addressed in the political integration pillar as 
proposed in the Northern Corridor Integration projects (NCIP).134. The political federation 
component agreed upon includes, a development of a framework for the political federation for 
the countries, and development of a constitution to guide in the political integration of the 
countries. This followed the first agreement in the initial summit of the heads of states in 
2013.135 The political federation component is currently spearheaded by the EAC secretariat.136 
The EAC is rapidly growing economically but the recurrent interruptions resulting from 
political instability dictate the future of the willingness of these countries to work together for 
economic growth in the region.137 However, the coalition of the willing states towards political 
integration under the NCIP is a positive sign that the cooperation of these countries is 
foreseeable. Some of the key initiatives under the political integration are shaped by the 
international development agencies who to a large extent contribute towards the infrastructural 
development and consequently the economic growth. 
To promote regional institutional integration, it is imperative that proper institutions address 
conflict avoidance and promote political integration are supported. It is necessary to create 
robust institutional support and having regular meetings to discuss the strategies that can be 
carried out to ensure that the region benefits from regional peaceful co-existence and to foster 
development in the region. These should be followed by capacity building of the institutions to 
carry out monitoring of the impact of the non-political cooperation on economic growth in the 
region. 
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Political integration should not be isolated from other aspects of regional cooperation such as 
the facilitation of international commerce and the promotion of security. Hitherto, various 
initiatives have been developed to spearhead the security and cooperation in the region starting 
from the African Union (AU) level to the country level. Amongst the achievements attained to 
date on regional integration are the various initiatives under the political federation which 
notably include: the adoption of the AU Agenda 2063, the updated EAC regional Strategy on 
Peace and Security that was adopted in 2014 by the Council of Ministers that aimed at 
addressing crime management, and conflict resolution amongst the member states.138 These 
two broad categories have been initiated through other programmes such as the ‘Silencing the 
Guns 2020’ that considers promoting trade and free movement of people in the block. In 
tandem with such programmes, there is a deliberate effort by the heads of states to form some 
Panel of Eminent persons to oversee and foster what is called preventive diplomacy.139 
There is room for more sustainable progress in the EAC with respect to regional power markets 
integration. This concerns two major areas that have legal implications. The first is a contextual 
and practical understanding of security. The second concerns the assessment of regional 
strategy. Generally, sub-Saharan African countries have not expanded the contextual meaning 
of security to include cyber matters. As at 2016, more than half of the 54 African countries 
lacked specific legislation to combat cybercrime.140 This trend does not reflect the urgent need 
to factor in cybersecurity in the African electricity market, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Efficient power markets are inextricably connected with technological advancements such as 
the digitalisation of the energy sector generally.141 The need for a deliberate and thoughtful 
approach to cybersecurity can be illustrated through the recent experience of South Africa. 
Although South Africa has sustained pioneering efforts to modernise its electricity sector for 
many years,142 a major South African power company suffered a ransomware attack in 
Johannesburg. The virus encrypted all databases, applications and network.143 The East Africa 
Community should leverage African regional efforts to harmonise efforts aimed at combatting 
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cybercrime, and it is necessary to consider the electricity market in a specific manner. The most 
recent Kenyan legislation on cybercrimes has the potential to inspire neighbouring countries to 
prioritise international cooperation.144 This is because the Act contains several provisions in 
this regard.145 The provisions on mutual assistance consolidate previous efforts on mutual legal 
assistance generally.146   
A plan to establish the Eastern Africa Power Pool (EAPP) has been consolidated since the 
commencement of the Treaty for the establishment of the East Africa Community.147 This 
resulted in signing of an Inter-Governmental Memorandum of Understanding (IGMOU) for 
the establishment of the Eastern Africa Power Pool (EAPP) in 2005 and subsequently 
establishment of the regional strategy on scaling up access to modern energy services in the 
EAC. The progress has, however, been impeded by the focus of national strategies to increase 
energy access and reduction of poverty. The approach taken by the governments should be 
more holistic and proactive. For example, opening the electricity market for the region would 
not only yield higher economic welfare but also attract potential investment in the energy 
sector. Approaching the transmission investment planning at a regional level and establishing 
institutions that will ensure the harmonisation of the laws in the region will support the speedy 
development of an integrated electricity market.  
6. Conclusion 
This article has explored relevant practical areas and legal frameworks applicable to the Partner 
States of the East African Community. This has been done with a view to articulating how 
policy and legal harmonisation can be achieved in the regional market. The search for a 
common core has been conducted through a comparative analysis of similarities and 
differences by considering some themes. These include: key legislation that support the 
development of renewable energy, objectives of relevant electricity laws, structure of the 
regulatory support mechanisms, structure of the electricity sector and impediments to future 
electricity sector expansion.  
Countries such as Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda have made significant steps towards 
liberalisation through partial unbundling of their power sectors. These countries have also 
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enacted some laws that support regional power trade with the neighbouring countries.148 
However, Burundi is yet to develop laws that allow restructuring in the power sector and the 
sector remain vertically integrated. Rwanda has bridged the gap between Kenya, Tanzania and 
Uganda on the one hand, and Burundi on the other. Despite its historical civil law background, 
Rwanda has consolidated legal reform that has promoted legal certainty necessary for investor 
confidence.149 The need to promote and protect foreign investment in the region underscores 
the importance of a harmonised approach to the electricity market.  
In assessing the convergence of existing laws, which are useful in supporting anticipated 
electricity market coupling, there are substantial elements of the electricity laws in the various 
countries that need to be developed which especially promote regional power trade and 
increased competition. Furthermore, the establishment of a regional regulator to oversee the 
implementation of the future power market coupling and promoting liberalisation in the region 
is critical. This entity could focus on harmonisation of the laws among the Partner States of the 
EAC: develop market rules and regulation; monitor the power market, and capacity building 
for local institutions. In this context, the East African Court of Justice can play a pivotal role 
to ensure robust jurisprudence and adequate institutional support. As several judgments of the 
Court have illustrated,150 it is necessary to have a clear idea of how communal objectives should 
be prioritised in a pragmatic manner that does not undermine trust among the EAC Partner 
States and institutions.151 In this way, sustainable progress towards the ambitious targets of the 
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